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The last thirty-five years have brought a myriad of changes to 
the law of res judicata. Res judicata literally means "a thing de- 
cided."' The doctrine rests on the premise that once a controversy 
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1 .  The term res judicata has been used by the courts to mean two differ- 
ent things. Sometimes the courts use the term to describe any situation in which 
a party is foreclosed from litigating something later because of something that 
happened in earlier litigation. Used in this generic way, res judicata is an um- 
brella term that covers the whole area. The second, more technical meaning of 
res judicata is applicable only when a party is attempting to relitigate his whole 
753 
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has been decided, that determination should be conclusive in a 
subsequent a ~ t i o n . ~  While claim preclusion3 attempts to avoid du- 
plication of whole claims or cases, issue preclusion or collateral 
estoppel4 works to avoid duplication of particular issues. In effect, 
the doctrine of issue preclusion scans the first litigation and takes 
note of each issue decided in it. Then, if a second lawsuit based on 
a different cause of action attempts to reintroduce the same issue, 
issue preclusion intervenes to preclude relitigation of that issue and 
bind parties to the result originally achieved. 
The doctrine of issue preclusion has undergone significant de- 
velopments in recent years.5 In the context of federal civil litiga- 
claim or cause of action; thus res judicata would apply not only to foreclose 
rehearing matters that have been litigated earlier, but also to prevent litigation of 
matters that might have been litigated in the earlier action. In this technical 
sense, res judicata means "claim preclusion." See generally 18 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 13 1, 132 (3d ed. 1998); Rivet v. 
Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998) (defining res judicata). For the 
purposes of this article, I will use res judicata in its broad, umbrella sense to 
include both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 27 (1 982). 
3. Claim preclusion is one subset of res judicata. Claim preclusion is 
asserted by a party in the second action who claims that the other party cannot 
bring the lawsuit because the claim was already litigated in the first action. The 
party asserting claim preclusion can argue that the other party either lost in the 
first lawsuit and is therefore barred from bringing the claim, or the other party 
won in the prior lawsuit and therefore the claim merged in the first judgment. 
See generally Victoria L. Hooper, Avoiding the Trap of Res Judicata: A Practi- 
tioner's Guide to Litigating Multiple Employment Discrimination Claims in the 
Third Circuit, 45 VILL. L. REV.  743 (2000). 
4. Courts use the phrases collateral estoppel and issue preclusion inter- 
changeably. For the purposes of this article, I will use the term issue preclusion. 
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS 5 27 (1982); 18 MOORE, ET AL., supra note 1, at 'jl 132.01 [2]. 
5. For various articles discussing the developments in issue preclusion, 
see Wystan M. Ackerman, Precluding Defendantsfrom Relitigating Sentencing 
Findings in Subsequent Civil Suits, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 128 (2001); Monica 
Renee Brownewell, Rethinking the Restatement View (Again!): Multiple Inde- 
pendent Holdings and the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion, 37 VAL. U .  L. REV. 879 
(2003); Philip C. Chronakis, Cold Comfort for a Change: Trends of Preclusion 
in Habeas Corpus Litigation, 76 U .  DET. MERCY L. REV. 17 (1998); Collateral 
and Equitable Estoppel of Federal Criminal Defendants, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1221 (1976); Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases-A Supplement to the Dou- 
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tion, the Supreme Court abandoned the requirement of mutuality6 
in cases involving defensive issue precl~sion.~ As a result, only 
the party against whom issue preclusion is sought to be used must 
have been a party in the first a c t i ~ n . ~  Eight years later, in Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, ~ n c . , ~  the Supreme Court held that in the fed- 
eral civil context, trial courts should have broad discretion in al- 
lowing offensive issue preclu~ion.'~ Therefore, in federal civil 
ble Jeopardy Protection, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 274 (1967); Michael P. Daly, 
"Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor," Your Collaterally Estopped Masses? Guilty 
Pleas and Collateral Estoppel of Alienage in Criminal Proceedings: United 
States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 44 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1999); Mitchell Keiter, The 
Mauled Verdict: The Knoller Case Shows Why Res Judicata Should Protect 
Partial Convictions as Well as Acquittals, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 493 (2002); 
Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estop- 
pel in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379 (1994); David Lehn, Adjudicative 
Retroactivity as a Preclusion Problem: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 59 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563 (2004); The Due Process Roots of Criminal 
Collateral Estoppel, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1729 (1996); Alan D. Vestal, Issue 
Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REV. 281 (1980). 
6. The doctrine of mutuality prevents a party from relying on a former 
judgment unless he would have been bound by the judgment had the action been 
decided the other way. See Kirby v. Penn. R.R. Co., 188 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 
1951); Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (1968). An issue regarding mutuality arises 
when one of the parties in the first action is different from one of the parties in 
the second action. Under the traditional mutuality doctrine, there could be no 
preclusion in the second action unless the parties were identical because differ- 
ent parties necessarily resulted in a judgment that could not bind the new party 
in the second lawsuit. 
7. In Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 
(1971), the Supreme Court abandoned the rule of mutuality in the federal courts 
in the case of defensive issue preclusion. Id. at 349-50. 
8. Assume that Bob sues Carl for negligence and loses on the ground 
that Bob was contributorily negligent. Bob then sues Donald in a second action. 
Donald asserts issue preclusion and argues that the issue of negligence has al- 
ready been determined and that Bob is the negligent party. Donald, who was not 
a party in the first action, is using issue preclusion defensively to defeat the 
claim in the second action. Following Blonder-Tongue, Donald is permitted to 
use issue preclusion to defeat Bob's claim as long as Bob was a party in the first 
action. 
9. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
10. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Assume 
that Bob sues Carl for negligence and loses on the ground that Bob was con- 
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cases, issue preclusion can be used in the second lawsuit by either 
the defendant or the plaintiff and can bind a party who was not a 
party in the first action. ' I  
Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel 
has also been a rule of federal criminal law since 1916.'* More 
recently, in 1970, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defen- 
dant's right to use issue preclusion offensively against the govern- 
ment is rooted in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double 
jeopardy.13 Therefore, a defendant has a constitutional right to 
assert issue preclusion against the government to prevent the gov- 
ernment from relitigating an issue determined in a previous action 
in favor of the defendant.14 
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the rationale 
enunciated in Parklane can be applied in the criminal context, thus 
allowing the government to invoke offensive issue preclusion to 
prevent the defendant from relitigating an issue that was decided in 
a previous criminal trial in favor of the government. The lower 
federal courts are divided on whether offensive collateral estoppel 
is appropriate in the criminal context.15 Recent decisions have con- 
tributorily negligent. Now, in a second action, Donald sues Bob for harms re- 
sulting from the same accident. Donald asserts issue preclusion and argues that 
Bob was already found to be negligent in the first action. This is an example of 
offensive issue preclusion because Donald, who was not a party to the first ac- 
tion, is using issue preclusion to establish his claim. 
11. See, e.g., Appling v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (allowing offensive issue preclusion to prevent defendant from reliti- 
gating whether termination without cause was a provision of the contract); Loeb 
Indus., Inc. v Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 496 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing 
offensive issue preclusion and dismissing claims); Pena v. Travis, 2002 WL 
31886175, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,2002) (allowing defensive issue preclusion 
and rejecting plaintiffs claim of civil rights violation where the same matter 
brought against the same defendants in earlier action); Meador v Oryx Energy 
Co., 87 F. Supp. 2d 658, 667 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (granting summary judgment to 
defendant on grounds of issue preclusion when the issue raised in the second 
suit had been adequately and finally litigated in the first case). 
12. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). 
13. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
14. See id. at 445. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1243 
(10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to allow offensive issue preclusion following a guilty 
plea); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 897 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to al- 
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tinued to extend the law of issue preclusion by allowing the use of 
offensive issue preclusion in criminal trials that involve issues of 
citizenship status, while refusing to expand it to other contexts.I6 
In a country that has been recently scarred by the events of 
September 11, 2001, the current position of the courts is troubling. 
According to the United States Census Bureau, between eight rnil- 
low offensive issue preclusion); Hernendez-Uribe v. United States, 5 15 F.2d 20, 
22 (8th Cir. 1975) (allowing offensive issue preclusion); Pena-Cabanillas v. 
United States, 394 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1968) (allowing offensive issue pre- 
clusion); United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.Ca1. 1959) 
(allowing offensive issue preclusion). Compare Hernandez-Uribe v. United 
States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1057 (1976) (af- 
firming defendant's conviction, holding that issue preclusion prevented defen- 
dant from relitigating his citizenship status, because the defendant was bound by 
an earlier adjudication in which he pleaded guilty to a matter involving the same 
crime) and Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(affirming defendant's conviction, holding that collateral estoppel prevented 
defendant from relitigating his alien status, because it had already been deter- 
mined under a prior adjudication) with United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 
F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998) (reversing the defendant's conviction, holding 
that the government may not use a judgment following a plea of guilty to collat- 
erally estop a criminal defendant from relitigating an issue in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding) and United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 636 (1 lth Cir. 
1992) (reversing defendant's conviction, holding that the government may not 
collaterally estop a criminal defendant from relitigating an issue decided against 
the defendant in a different court in a prior proceeding). 
16. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. currency in the amount of 
$1 19,984.00, 304 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to allow government to use 
issue preclusion in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding); Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 897 
(refusing to allow issue preclusion by government in case involving RICO); 
Harnage, 976 F.2d at 636 (refusing to allow offensive use of issue preclusion by 
government in case involving conspiracy to distribute drugs). Other than the 
cases in footnote 15, there have been very few decisions aside from alienage 
cases that have allowed offensive issue preclusion. In People v. Ford, 416 P.2d 
132 (Cal. 1966), the California Supreme Court held in a felony-murder case that 
the doctrine of issue preclusion applies to both civil and criminal cases. Ford, 
41 6 P.2d at 138. In Carmody v. Seventh Judicial District Court In and For Lin- 
coln County, 398 P.2d 706 (Nev. 1965), the Nevada Supreme Court stated in 
dicta that issue preclusion could be applied against defendants in a case involv- 
ing felony-murder. Carmody, 398 P.2d at 707. Finally, in United States v. Co- 
lacurcio, 514 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974), the court did not allow issue preclusion 
under the facts of the case, but did state in dictum that issue preclusion could be 
invoked against the defendant in all types of cases. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d at 6. 
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lion and twelve million illegal aliens are believed to be living in 
the United States, with anywhere from one million to three million 
more expected this year." At the same time, to address the secu- 
rity concerns, the federal government has increased its emphasis on 
interior enforcement of illegal aliens. The American public is ex- 
periencing the unleashing of xenophobia and is vulnerable to 
demagoguery about the status of aliens in our country. 
This article addresses whether the expansion of the doctrine of 
issue preclusion in the federal criminal area should mirror the ex- 
pansion of the doctrine in the federal civil area.18 The article ex- 
amines the general requirements of issue preclusion and the evolu- 
tion of issue preclusion in both the civil and criminal context.19 
Next, this article examines the current status of offensive and de- 
fensive issue preclusion when the first suit is civil and the second 
suit is ~riminal,~' the first suit is criminal and the second suit is 
and where both the first and second action is criminal.22 
The article then analyzes whether the approach taken by the courts 
17. See Kevin E. Deardorff & Lisa M. Blumerman, Evaluating Compo- 
nents of International Migration: Estimates of the Foreign-Born Population by 
Migrant Status in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 58, 
2001), http://www.census.gov/populatiodwww/documentatiodtwps0058.html; 
Joe Costanzo, Cynthia Davis, Caribert Irazi, Daniel Goodkind, & Roberto Rami- 
rez, Evaluating Components of International Migration: The Residual Foreign 
Born (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 61, 2001), http://www. 
census.gov/populatiodww~/do~umentation/twpsOO6l .htrnl. 
18. I will only be addressing federal cases, although various state courts 
have looked at this issue and have found different results. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. 
Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding prior convic- 
tion for attempted murder is not preclusive in subsequent cases for murder in- 
volving same victim); State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1972) (holding defendant has a right to a jury trial on all issues related to a 
criminal charge); Rouse v. State, 97 A.2d 285 (Md. 1953) (holding that issue 
preclusion would abridge the constitutional right of the accused to have the case 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Carmody, 398 P.2d at 707 (Nev. 1965) 
(finding that a guilty plea to the crime of robbery was preclusive in subsequent 
trial for felony murder); State v. Thomas, 276 A.2d 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1971) (asserting that collateral estoppel is not available to the government). 
19. See infra Part 11. 
20. See infra Part 111-V. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. 
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in the civil area should be applied to the criminal area, and the ap- 
propriate parameters of that approach.23 Finally, the article con- 
cludes that although the courts should allow the government to use 
offensive collateral estoppel in criminal cases, the courts must be 
vigilant in ensuring that there is no prejudice. 24 
In both the civil and criminal context, issue preclusion may be 
applied if certain elements are present.25 First, the issue on which 
there was a decision in the prior litigation must be the same issue 
that is being considered in the pending l i t i ga t i~n .~~  Second, a deci- 
sion on that issue must have been necessary for the judgment in the 
first litigation and must have been a final judgment.27 Although 
23. See infra Part VI. 
24. See infra Part VII. But see Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra 
note 6, for the argument that collateral estoppel should only be used for crimes 
containing a status element. 
25. The requirements of issue preclusion are set forth in 1B J.MOORE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.443[1] at 3901 (2d ed. 1974). 
26. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Sav. Assn., 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 
1942). 
27. Id. Because issue preclusion can only exist if the precise issue has 
been litigated and was necessary to the judgment below, the court must examine 
the first proceeding to determine if the issue decided was necessary for the 
judgment. When the first proceeding is a civil suit, and the second proceeding is 
also a civil suit, the court can look to see if there was a special verdict or find- 
ings of fact and conclusions of law in order to identify (1) how the issues were 
decided and (2) whether they were necessary to the judgment. Even when the 
first proceeding is a criminal prosecution, and the jury has returned a guilty ver- 
dict, it may be possible to determine the issues that were necessarily decided. 
See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 572 (1951) 
(enunciating the trial court's role in looking at the first proceeding and explain- 
ing the findings to the jury in the second proceeding). When the first proceeding 
is a criminal prosecution and the jury has returned an acquittal, it becomes very 
difficult for the court to determine whether the issues were necessarily decided. 
See United States v. King, 563 F.2d 559, 561 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusing to allow 
the defendant to use issue preclusion in a second prosecution following an ac- 
quittal because the defendant could not demonstrate that the precise issue had 
been necessarily litigated and decided in the first prosecution). In addition, it is 
possible for issue preclusion to exist if a party fails to contest an issue that is 
necessary to a decision and a judgment that is unfavorable to that party is found 
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both of these elements raise a myriad of issues, they are not dis- 
cussed at length in this article. 
A third traditional requirement of issue preclusion in the civil 
context has been that the parties in the second proceeding must be 
the same as the parties in the first proceeding in which the issue 
sought to be established was originally A judgment 
that was obtained in the first action could not be used in a subse- 
quent action against someone who was not a party in that first ac- 
tion because that would violate the non-party's right to due proc- 
e ~ s . ~ ~  Under the traditional mutuality doctrine, courts held that, if a 
judgment could not be used against one party because it would 
violate due process, that judgment could also not be used offen- 
sively even though such use would not raise any constitutional im- 
plications.30 As a result, the doctrine of mutuality prevented a 
party from relying on a former judgment unless that party would 
have been bound by that judgment had the action been decided the 
other way.3' 
The move away from the strict requirement of mutuality in the 
civil context began with the California state court's decision in 
Bernhard v. Bank of A r n e r i ~ a . ~ ~  In Bernhard, an ailing woman set 
on that issue, a court in a subsequent proceeding may find that issue to be pre- 
cluded. In criminal cases, this becomes a significant problem in cases where the 
first proceeding is a guilty plea. Under the Restatement of Judgments approach, 
there could be no issue preclusion because the first proceeding was not actually 
litigated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1 982). However, a 
number of courts have held that the parties could use issue preclusion following 
a guilty plea when the second litigation is a civil suit. See Ivers v. United 
States, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a criminal conviction based 
upon a guilty plea conclusively establishes that the defendant engaged in the 
criminal act for which he was convicted). 
28. Bemhard, 122 P.2d at 895. 
29. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979); 
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,329 (1971). 
30. See Ralph Wolff & Sons v. N.Z. Ins. Co., 58 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Ky. 
1933) ("To bind the plaintiffs the defendants must also have been bound, for an 
estoppel is always mutual."). 
31. Kirby v. Penn. R.R. Co., 188 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1951); Bemhard, 
122 P.2d at 894. 
32. Bemhard, 122 P.2d at 895. 
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up a joint account with her caretaker.33 The caretaker then re- 
moved the money from the joint account and set up a new account 
in the caretaker's own name.34 The woman died, and as executor 
of the estate, the caretaker did not include the money from the joint 
account in the estate.35 When the caretaker filed an accounting and 
simultaneously resigned as executor, the other testamentary bene- 
ficiaries objected.36 The probate court overruled the objections and 
settled the account, finding that the woman had made a gift of the 
money to the  aret taker.^' Thus, in the first action, the caretaker 
prevailed after a finding that the money was a gift. 
In the second action, one of the testamentary beneficiaries be- 
came the administratrix following the caretaker's re~ignation.~~ 
This adrninistratrixheneficiary brought a new action against the 
bank, alleging that it was liable for allowing the transfer of the 
funds from the woman's account to the caretaker's account without 
the woman's approval.39 The bank then sought issue preclusion 
against the administratrix on the issue of the woman's consent, 
based on the finding of the probate court in the first action that the 
money was a gift.40 The administratrix argued the traditional doc- 
trine of mutuality should apply because, since she could not have 
used estoppel against the bank, then the bank could not use estop- 
pel against the admini~tratrix.~' 
The court rejected the mutuality argument in the context of 
defensive issue preclusion, and stated that "[tlhe criteria for deter- 
mining who may assert a plea of res judicata differ fundamentally 
from the criteria for determining against whom a plea of res judi- 
cata may be asserted."42 Although due process forbids binding a 
non-party to the judgment in the first action, if the party against 
whom the claim is asserted has had his day in court, either person- 







40. Id. at 893-94. 
41. Id. at 894. 
42. Id. 
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ally or through a representative, then it should be proper to allow 
the assertion of the doctrine against that party.43 In Bernhard, the 
administratrix had already had her day in court in the first action; 
and therefore, the bank could properly use the court's finding 
against her.44 Thus, the California Supreme Court held that if a 
party had already litigated the issue in the first civil action, that 
particular finding could be used against that party in the second 
action, even if the party asserting issue preclusion was not a party 
in the first action.45 
In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois 
~ o u n d a t i o n , ~ ~  the United States Supreme Court, following the 
changes set in motion by Justice Traynor in Bernhard, abandoned 
the rule of mutuality in the federal courts in the case of defensive 
issue precl~sion.~' The Court distinguished between offensive and 
defensive use of non-mutual issue preclusion and held that, with 
respect to defensive issue preclusion, there was no need to adhere 
to the traditional doctrine of mutuality.48 As a result, in civil ac- 
tions in the federal courts, when a party has already litigated an 
issue in the first action, the finding can then be used against that 
party in the second action, even if the party asserting defensive 
issue preclusion was not a party in the first action.49 
Eight years later in Parklane the Supreme Court dealt with the 
more difficult issue of the offensive use of issue preclu~ion.~~ In 
the first a~ t ion ,~ '  the SEC sought injunctive relief against Parklane 
on the grounds that Parklane had issued a materially false and rnis- 
leading proxy ~ ta tement .~~ The district court found for the SEC, a 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 895. 
46. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
47. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 
(1971). 
48. Id. at 329-30. 
49. Id. 
50. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). 
51. The first action actually began after the second action but concluded 
first. Id. at 324. However, both actions arose out of the same transaction. Id. at 
327. 
52. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 
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declaratory judgment was entered,53 and the Second Circuit af- 
firmed.54 The second action was a shareholders' derivative action 
in which the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, as- 
serting that Parklane should be estopped from relitigating the issue 
it lost in the first action, namely whether the proxy statement was 
false and ~nisleading.~~ The district court denied the motion on the 
grounds that it would deprive the defendant of his right to a trial by 
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the prior adjudi- 
cation removed those facts from controversy; thus there was no 
right to a trial by Consequently, unlike Bernhard and 
Blonder-Tongue, in which the parties were trying to use issue pre- 
clusion defensively, the Parklane plaintiffs were trying to use issue 
preclusion offensively to establish their claim that the proxy state- 
ment was false and mi~leading.~~ 
The Court allowed the use of issue preclusion here even 
though it was ~ffensive.~' Finding that the application of issue 
preclusion would not deny Parklane its Seventh Amendment right 
to a jury trial, the Court held that Parklane had a full and fair op- 
portunity to litigate the factual issues in the first trial.60 The Court 
stated that in cases involving offensive issue preclusion, the trial 
courts should have broad discretion in deciding whether issue pre- 
clusion is appr~pria te .~~ In making that determination, the trial 
court should apply a balancing test to see whether the plaintiff 
could have joined the first action but failed to do so, and whether 
the second action presented procedural opportunities that were not 
available in the first action.62 
1976), a f d ,  558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). 
53. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. at 486-87. 
54. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d at 1090. 
55. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 819-22. 
58. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979). 
59. Id. at 33 1-32. 
60. Id. at 335-36. 
61. Id. at 331. 
62. Id. at 329-31. 
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In the federal civil context, therefore, defensive issue preclu- 
sion is always allowed,63 while offensive issue preclusion is al- 
lowed on a case-by-case basis, at the discretion of the trial judge.@ 
In the federal criminal context, on the other hand, a defendant has 
been able to use issue preclusion to preclude the government from 
relitigating an issue determined in a prior acquittal since 1 9 1 6 . ~ ~  
Rejecting the civil rule of mutuality when issue preclusion is used 
defensively, the courts have held that even though a criminal de- 
fendant cannot be estopped on an issue decided against him, the 
defendant can use defensive issue preclusion to estop the govern- 
ment when the issue in the first proceeding was decided in the de- 
fendant's favor.66 The rationale is that the defendant "always has 
the right to have the jury or the triers of fact determine anew every 
element of 
In Ashe v. ~wenson,~*which was decided in 1970, one year 
before Blonder-Tongue and nine years before Parklane, the Su- 
preme Court held that asserting collateral estoppel against the gov- 
ernment is a constitutional right of the accused, inherent in the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.69 In Ashe, the de- 
fendant and three other co-defendants were prosecuted for a rob- 
bery that occurred during a poker game.70 The defendant was ac- 
q~ i t t ed .~ '  Six weeks later the defendant was brought to trial for a 
second robbery that occurred during the same poker game.72 The 
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that he had previously 
been acquitted.73 The court denied the motion and the defendant 
Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of 111. Found., 402 U.S. 3 13, 3 13 
Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 33 1. 
65. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916). 
66. United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466,468 (3d Cir. 1943); United 
States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479,482 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). 
67. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. at 482. 
68. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
69. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,445 (1970). 
70. Id. at 437-38. 
7 1. Id. at 439. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
Heinonline - -  34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 764 2003-2004 
2004 Issue Preclusion 765 
was convicted.74 The defendant then brought a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus on the ground that the second prosecution vio- 
lated his constitutional right not to be put in double jeopardy.75 
The United States Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that 
"when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a 
valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be litigated be- 
tween the same parties in any future lawsuit."76 Therefore, because 
the jury in the first prosecution determined that there was reason- 
able doubt as to whether the defendant was one of the robbers, the 
state was precluded from presenting evidence on identification in 
the second prosecution.77 
The Court noted that the "rule of collateral estoppel in [fed- 
eral] criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and 
archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism 
and rationality."78 The Court set out a test where the trial court has 
to examine the record of the prior proceeding including the plead- 
ings, evidence, and charge, and then determine whether a jury 
could have reached its verdict on a ground other than what the de- 
fendant seeks to estop.79 If the trial court concludes that a jury 
would not have reached its verdict under any other rationale, the 
defendant is permitted to use issue preclusion against the govern- 
ment.80 
Therefore, a defendant can use issue preclusion defensively in 
a second criminal prosecution to bar the government from relitigat- 
ing an issue that was decided in the first prosecution where the 
defendant was acquitted. There is no requirement of mutuality. 
This needs to be distinguished from the situation where the 
government seeks to use issue preclusion offensively to bar the 
defendant from relitigating an issue that was decided against the 
defendant at a previous criminal trial. The Supreme Court has not 
spoken on the issue and the lower courts are d i~ ided .~ '  The analy- 
74. Id. at 439-40. 
75. Id. at 440. 
76. Id. at 443. 
77. Id. at 446. 
78. Id.at444. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 445. 
81. In Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971), the defendant was con- 
Heinonline - -  34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 765 2003-2004 
766 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 34 
sis by the courts is further complicated when the action is either a 
civil action or a criminal action that does not end in an acquittal or 
conviction. 
111. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE USE OF DEFENSIVE ISSUE 
PRECLUSION 
Defensive issue preclusion comes into play when a party who 
was a criminal defendant in a prior prosecution is either being sued 
civilly or is being criminally prosecuted in a second action.82 
When the actions involve similar issues, the defendant may argue 
that an issue that has been decided in the first action should not be 
relitigated, and that the prosecution or plaintiff should be bound by 
that earlier deter~nination.~~ To use issue preclusion at all, the issue 
on which there was a prior determination must be the same issue 
that is being considered in the pending litigation, and a decision on 
the issue must have been necessary for the judgment in the first 
l i t i ga t i~n .~~  The law is fairly clear that a criminal defendant may 
use issue preclusion to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution if the 
first criminal prosecution ended with either a jury verdict or a dis- 
missal of the ind i~ tmen t .~~  The law is less clear if the first criminal 
victed of armed robbery. Id. at 384. After a reversal for an error in jury instruc- 
tions, the defendant was retried and acquitted. Id. He was then tried and con- 
victed at a third trial for the robbery of a different person during the same inci- 
dent. Id. at 385. The defendant argued that the issue of whether he was a robber 
had already been decided at the previous trial, and therefore could not be reliti- 
gated. Id. The state appellate court held that the issue had been properly reliti- 
gated, reasoning that the first conviction nullified the later acquittal for purposes 
of collateral estoppel. Id. at 386. The United States Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that there is no requirement of mutuality under its decision in Ashe. Id. 
Therefore, although the prior conviction could not be used against the defendant, 
the prior acquittal could be used against the government. Id. Although this 
could be interpreted as disapproval of the use of collateral estoppel by the gov- 
ernment against criminal defendants, it is nowhere near definitive. 
82. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85,87 (1916). 
83. See, e.g., Ashe, 397 U.S. at 436 (holding that where defendant was 
acquitted of robbery charge in the trial of one victim when witnesses unable to 
identify him as participant, the government was precluded from subsequent 
prosecution of defendant for same crime against a different victim). 
84. Id. at 443. 
85. Id. at 44445. 
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prosecution ended with a plea bargain, or if the second action is 
civil and not criminal. 
Like the use of issue preclusion in the civil context, the doc- 
trine of criminal defensive issue preclusion has its roots in com- 
mon law.86 A criminal defendant first used issue preclusion to bar 
a subsequent criminal prosecution in 1916 in United States v. Op- 
penheimer.87 In Oppenheimer, the defendant argued that the gov- 
ernment was precluded from indicting him because the indictment 
for the same offense had been dismissed on statute of limitations 
grounds.88 The government argued that the defendant could not 
assert issue preclusion because no jeopardy had attached in the first 
prosec~t ion.~~ Justice Holmes determined that even though double 
jeopardy had not attached in the first proceeding, defensive crimi- 
nal issue preclusion had its source in fundamental rights other than 
the guarantee against double jeopardy.90 Based on this reasoning, 
the Court affirmed the dismissal of the second indi~tment.~' 
Following Oppenheimer, the use of defensive issue preclusion 
in subsequent criminal prosecutions became important to protect 
defendants in ways that were unavailable under the Double Jeop- 
ardy Clause of the ~onstitution.~' In 1961, the Second Circuit con- 
tinued its broad interpretation of defensive collateral estoppel, 
holding in United States v. KrameP3 that an acquittal on burglary 
86. In The Queen v. Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423,431 (1890), the court held that 
"the criminal law is in unison with that which prevails in civil proceedings" and 
"where a criminal charge has been adjudicated . . . that adjudication, whether it 
takes the form of an acquittal or conviction, is final . . . and may be pleaded in 
bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offence . . . ." 
87. 242 U.S. 85 (1916). 
88. Id. at 86. 
89. Id. at 87. 
90. Id. at 87-88. 
91. Id. at 88. 
92. The Double Jeopardy Clause has been construed very narrowly. The 
traditional test compares the statutory elements of each charged offense, and the 
court looks to see "whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932). The Court has only expanded double jeopardy protections to bar subse- 
quent prosecutions for lesser-included offenses. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 
682,682 (1977). 
93. 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). 
Heinonline - -  34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 767 2003-2004 
768 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 34 
charges in the first action barred a subsequent action for conspiracy 
to burglarize. 94 
In 1970, in Ashe, the Court parted ways with Oppenheimer 
when it constitutionalized issue preclusion as part of the Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy rather than 
grounding it as a requirement of due process.95 Ironically, rather 
than broadening the use of defensive issue preclusion, the deci- 
sions following Ashe began to erode the use of the doctrine by 
criminal defendants. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 
 irea arms,'^ the Court held that the defendant could not use issue 
preclusion to bar a civil forfeiture proceeding following an acquit- 
tal because the acquittal did not prove that the defendant was inno- 
cent; rather, it only proved "the existence of reasonable doubt as to 
his The Court held that the government should still be 
permitted to show in the civil forfeiture that the defendant had 
been involved in criminal conduct by a preponderance of the evi- 
d e n ~ e . ~ ~  Six years later, in Dowling v. United states,'' the Court 
again limited the use of defensive issue preclusion.'00 In Dowling, 
the defendant was acquitted of robbery in the first trial in which he 
was allegedly identified when the victim unmasked him.''' In the 
second action, the defendant was tried for a bank robbery in which 
94. United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). Many states 
also followed that trend. See State v. Safrit, 551 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding later trial on same charge involving different primary offense is 
barred by preclusion); People v. Mitchell, 81 Cal. App. 4th 132 (2000) (deter- 
mining state is prohibited under collateral estoppel doctrine from presenting 
evidence on prior conviction when the evidence was insufficient to support a 
sentence enhancement); State v. Secret, 524 N.W.2d 551 (Neb. 1994) (holding 
an indeterminate sentence was barred by collateral estoppel); People v. Joon Ho 
Chin, 186 Misc. 2d 454 (N.Y. Sup. 2000) (barring state by collateral estoppel 
from introducing evidence of physical force during retrial of rape); People v. 
Beltran, 210 P.2d 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Harris v. State, 17 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. 
1941). 
95. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,44546 (1970). 
96. 465 U.S. 354 (1984). 
97. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 361-62. 
98. Id. at 362. 
99. 493 U.S. 342 (1990). 
100. Dowling, 493 U.S. 342,349 (1990). 
10 1. Id. at 344-45. 
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he allegedly wore the same mask.lo2 The defendant argued that the 
victim was precluded from testifying that the masked defendant 
had robbed her.'03 The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction 
because in the first trial the government had failed to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the act, and to 
introduce evidence of the same act in another trial, the government 
only had to show that a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
defendant had committed the act.Io4 Because of the difference in 
the burdens of proof, the Court held that the defendant could not 
use issue preclusion,105 once again substantially restricting its use. 
Therefore, even though the Court has held that the criminal 
defendant's defensive use of issue preclusion against the govern- 
ment is not subject to the requirements of mutuality and, in fact, is 
protected by the United States Constitution, its use has been lim- 
ited. As a general rule, it can always be used in a second criminal 
prosecution when the first prosecution ended in an acquittal.'06 
There are many problems, however, if the second lawsuit is civil or 
if the first lawsuit did not end in a jury verdict. 
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE USE OF CRIMINAL OFFENSIVE 
ISSUE PRECLUSION 
The only guidance by the Supreme Court as to the use of of- 
fensive issue preclusion in criminal cases derives from Standefer v. 
United States.Io7 In Standefer, the prosecution charged the defen- 
dant with aiding and abetting after the principal had already been 
acquitted of the substantive ~ffense. '~ '  The defendant unsuccess- 
fully argued that the prosecution should be estopped from prose- 
cuting him because the individual whom he had allegedly aided 
and abetted had been acquitted by a jury.'09 The Court recalled 
that it had authorized "nonmutual collateral estoppel" in both 
Id. 
Id. at 344-47. 
Id. at 348-49. 
Id. at 349. 
See supra note 27. 
447 U.S. 10 (1980). 
Id. at 11-13. 
Id. at 13. 
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Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, and that the estoppel applied in 
Parklane was offen~ive."~ The defendant in Standefer, however, 
was not attempting to use offensive issue preclusion, but was at- 
tempting to use defensive issue preclusion.'" The Court distin- 
guished Standefer from Parklane and Blonder-Tongue and rejected 
the "application of nonmutual [collateral] estoppel in criminal 
cases.""2 Although some courts have construed this to mean that 
the Court "declined to extend Parklane to criminal  case^,""^ the 
more rational conclusion is that the Court did not reach any con- 
clusions about offensive preclusion in criminal cases. The facts 
did not deal with offensive issue preclusion; the Court did not dis- 
cuss offensive preclusion; and its analysis only discusses why 
nonmutual defensive issue preclusion was not appropriate in the 
case. 'I4 
The first lower court case where the government used issue 
preclusion offensively against a criminal defendant was United 
States v. p angel-~erez."~ The defendant in Rangel-Perez was 
convicted in 1943 of illegal entry into the United States from Mex- 
ico.l16 The indictment underlying that conviction stated that the 
defendant had been deported from the United States in 1941 and 
was discovered back in the United States in 1942."' Approxi- 
mately fifteen years later, the defendant, after being discovered in 
California, was again indicted and tried for illegal entry at a trial 
before a judge.''' At the second trial, the government argued that 
the issue as to whether the defendant was an alien in 1943 was 
110. Id. at 21. 
11 1. Id. The defendant urged the Court "to apply nonmutual estoppel 
against the Government." Id. 
112. Id. at 23. 
113. United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 894 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994). 
114. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22-23. The Court stated that it was concerned 
about an erroneous acquittal, perhaps the result of jury nullification, which could 
then multiply by binding future juries. Id. 
115. 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
116. Id. at 621. For the relevant statutory language, see 8 U.S.C. § 180 
(1940), which required that a defendant knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, and 
feloniously enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. 5 180 (repealed June 27, 1952) has 
been replaced by 8 U.S.C. $3 1 101(g) and 1326. 
1 17. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 622. 
118. Id.at622. 
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fully adjudicated at the earlier trial, and that issue preclusion could 
therefore be invoked against the defendant to alleviate the need to 
determine the defendant's c i t i zen~hi~ ."~  The court held that the 
government could invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel against 
the accused to establish his nationality status as being that of alien 
in 1943.l2' The issue of the defendant's citizenship was actually 
litigated at the 1943 trial, a finding of fact that the defendant was 
an alien was made, and this finding was necessary to the judgment 
of guilty of the crime of illegal entry.12' Therefore, the court, for 
the first time, allowed the government to invoke non-mutual offen- 
sive issue preclusion. 122 
Nine years later, in Pena-Cabanillas v. United ~ t a t e s , ' ~ ~  the 
Ninth Circuit also addressed whether the government could use 
offensive issue preclusion to prevent the defendant from relitigat- 
ing his status as an alien.124 In Pena-Cabanillas, the defendant was 
convicted in 1964 for falsely and willfully representing himself to 
be a United States citizen.'25 In the second trial, the defendant was 
indicted and tried for the offense of illegal entry into the United 
States.'26 In the second action, the district court took judicial no- 
tice of the 1964 conviction and held that since the issue of citizen- 
ship was the same in both trials, the defendant was precluded from 
offering evidence pertaining to his citizenship up to and including 
the 1964 con~iction.'~' Following the reasoning of the court in 
Rangel-Perez, the court found that the district court had correctly 
allowed offensive issue preclu~ion. '~~ 
In 1975, the Eighth Circuit also upheld the use of offensive is- 
sue preclusion in Hernandez-Uribe v. United  state^,"^ which also 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 626-27. 
121. Id. at 626. 
122. Id. 
123. 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968). 
124. Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968). 
125. Id. at 786. The defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 5 91 1 
(2003). Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 786. 
128. Id. at 787-88. 
129. 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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involved the crime of illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. 5 1326.I3O The 
district court instructed the jury that the defendant was bound by 
an earlier judicial determination that he was an alien as of 1967, 
and therefore the jury could not consider any evidence pertaining 
to his citizenship as of that date.13' The defendant appealed, argu- 
ing that the instruction deprived "him of his right to a presumption 
of innocence, his sixth amendment right to a trial by jury, and his 
right to confrontation of witnesses . . . ."132 The court held that by 
pleading guilty in the 1967 case involving the same crime, the de- 
fendant admitted all of the essential elements of the crime, includ- 
ing that he was an alien until June 1967, and therefore issue pre- 
clusion was proper.'33 Although the defendant attempted to distin- 
guish this case from Pena-Cabanillas and Rangel-Perez by arguing 
that the earlier finding of alienage in his case was the result of a 
guilty plea and not a full adversary proceeding, the court held that 
procedures surrounding a guilty plea ensure that there is a factual 
basis and therefore issue preclusion is still appr~pria te . '~~ 
More recently, in United States v. Gallardo-~endez, '~~ the 
Tenth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction for violating 8 
130. Id. at 20-2 1 .  
131. Id. at 21. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 22. In 1980, the Ninth Circuit again addressed the issue in 
United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980). In Bejar- 
Matrecios, the defendant was tried for illegal reentry into the United States un- 
der 8 U.S.C. Q 1326. Id. at 82. At the trial, the government introduced evidence 
that showed that the defendant had once pled guilty to a violation of 8 U.S.C. Q 
1325, which is misdemeanor illegal entry. Id. at 83. The government argued 
that under a theory of offensive issue preclusion the defendant's citizenship 
status had been determined by that prior conviction and could not be relitigated. 
Id. The district court allowed the preclusion. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the manner in which the government 
introduced the evidence was highly prejudicial, the court did emphasize that the 
doctrine of issue preclusion applies equally whether the previous criminal con- 
viction is based on a jury verdict or a guilty plea. Id. at 83-84. Had the evi- 
dence been properly introduced, evidence of the prior conviction would have 
conclusively established that the defendant was an alien at the time of the Q 1325 
conviction. Id. at 84. 
135. 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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U.S.C. 8 1 3 2 6 . ' ~ ~  The court held that the government may not use 
a judgment resulting from a plea of guilty to preclude "a criminal 
defendant from relitigating an issue in a subsequent criminal pro- 
~eeding." '~~ In this case, the defendant was indicted for violating 8 
U.S.C. 5 1326 in 1991, pled guilty, and was d e ~ 0 r t e d . l ~ ~  In 1996 
the defendant was again found in the United States, and was in- 
dicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for the "illegal reentry of a deported 
alien."'39 The government requested that the defendant be pre- 
cluded from contesting "his alienage prior to his 1991 convic- 
tion."l4' The defendant objected, but the district court invoked is- 
sue preclusion and instructed the jury that that there had been a 
judicial determination that prior to 1991 the defendant was not a 
citizen, and that "[tlhe defendant is bound by that determina- 
tion."14' The court did not address the broad question of whether 
issue preclusion could be asserted against a criminal defendant, but 
instead looked at the more narrow issue of whether a guilty plea 
can be used to preclude the defendant from relitigating an issue in 
a subsequent Disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit in Her- 
nandez-Uribe, the court found that the rules of criminal procedure 
do not protect the defendant in the same way as the protections 
afforded by a jury trial and the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Con~titution. '~~ Therefore, the court reversed the defen- 
dant's conviction and remanded the case for a new 
The Ninth Circuit has also approved, in theory, the offensive 
use of issue preclusion in a case not involving a status issue. 145 ln 
United States v. ~ o l a c u r c i o , ' ~ ~  the defendant appealed a conviction 
for income tax evasion alleging that the district court erred when it 
allowed certain facts from a previous proceeding to be considered 
Id. at 1246. 
Id. 
Id. at 1241. 
Id. 
Id. at 1241-42. 
Id. 
Id. at 1243. 
Id. at 1245. 
Id. at 1246. 
See United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1975). 
514 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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"as a fact proven in these  proceeding^."'^^ The defendant was pre- 
cluded in the second action from denying that he had received spe- 
cific amounts of money.'48 The district court held that although 
Rangel-Perez and Pena-Cababillas were "limited to the question 
of [a] defendant's status, the rationale of those cases" applies 
equally to cases that do not deal with status issues.'49 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, however, on the 
grounds that the specific amount of the payments was not a neces- 
sary element of the first conviction, and therefore did not satisfy 
the "necessarily litigated and essential to the judgment" require- 
ment of issue preclusion.'50 
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, other circuits have not al- 
lowed the government to use offensive issue preclusion. For in- 
stance, in United States v. ~ a r n a ~ e , ' ~ '  the Eleventh Circuit ana- 
lyzed whether the government could "preclude a defendant from 
relitigating a prior unsuccessful attempt to quash a subpoena in a 
different [federal] court. "Is2 The court refused to allow offensive 
collateral estoppel, finding that it would not serve its original pur- 
pose-judicial e~onomy."~ In addition, in United States v. Pe- 
l ~ l l o , ' ~ ~  the Third Circuit held that the application of offensive is- 
sue preclusion deprived the defendant of his right to a jury trial."' 
In Pelullo, the defendant was convicted in 1991 of forty-nine 
counts of wire fraud.Is6 On appeal, the court affirmed the convic- 
tion of count fifty-four, but reversed the conviction on all other 
counts because of the erroneous admission of some testimony.'57 
The defendant was retried, and convicted, and was sentenced for 
all convictions, including count fifty-four in 1993.Is8 The defen- 
Id. at 3. 
Id. at 4. 
Id. at 6. 
Id. at 6-7. 
976 F.2d 633 (1 1 th Cir. 1992). 
Hamage, 976 F.2d at 635. 
Id. 
14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 889. 
Id. at 885. 
Id. 
Id. 
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dant was again indicted for violations of RICO, and during the 
second trial, the district court admitted evidence of the conviction 
of count fifty-four for the purpose of proving the RICO count.15' 
The court then instructed the jury that "as a matter of law, the de- 
fendant has committed the wire fraud offense . . . [tlhat means you 
don't have to consider whether the government has proved this 
offense. 77160 
The lower courts are split as to whether the offensive use of 
issue preclusion should be allowed.161 The courts that have em- 
braced it have all used it against defendants in cases involving citi- 
zenship status.162 Although some courts have stated that it could be 
applied to defendants in any situation, those courts have not actu- 
ally allowed it for different r ea~0ns . I~~  Finally, some circuits have 
refused to allow offensive issue preclusion in any ~ i tua t ion . '~~  
V. THE ARGUMENTS BOTH FOR AND AGAINST USING OFFENSIVE 
ISSUE PRECLUSION I  CRIMINAL CASES 
The arguments for and against using offensive issue preclu- 
sion against a criminal defendant fall into two different categories. 
First, there is the issue of whether offensive issue preclusion de- 
prives the criminal defendant of his constitutional rights under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.'@ Second, if those rights are not 
violated, the question becomes whether the use of defensive issue 
preclusion satisfies the policies behind issue prec1u~ion.l~~ 
A. Constitutional Arguments 
The right to a trial by jury in a criminal proceeding is set forth 
in Article 111 of the Constitution, which states that "[tlhe [tlrial of 
159. Id. at 887. 
160. Id. 
161. See supra notes 115, 123, 129, 135, 151, and 154. 
162. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.Ca1. 
1959). 
163. See United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 634-36 (1 1 th Cir. 1992). 
164. See United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994). 
165. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 
166. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1240 (10th Cir. 
1998); Hamage, 976 F.2d at 635. 
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all crimes . . . shall be by Ulury. ,9167 This right is reiterated in the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides "[iln all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . . ,9168 The main function 
of the jury is to determine the facts of the case and to render a de- 
cision regarding the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant.16' 
One constitutional argument against the use of offensive issue 
preclusion against a criminal defendant is that issue preclusion de- 
prives the jury in the second trial of the opportunity to consider all 
of the evidence that affected the determination of guilt or inno- 
cence.l7' The language of the Sixth Amendment makes it clear that 
the right to a jury trial extends to each new criminal proceeding, 
not merely until one jury determines an issue.l7l Issue preclusion 
stands for the principle that "when an issue of ultimate fact has 
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue 
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 
9,172 lawsuit. When a court applies issue preclusion it instructs the 
jury that a required element of the case is already conclusively set- 
tled, thereby precluding the jury from a complete view of the 
facts.'73 The jury in the first trial could have reached a different 
result from the jury in the second trial, and thus the jury in the sec- 
ond trial must be presented with all of the evidence relating to the 
167. U. S. CONST. art 111, $ 2, c1.3. 
168. U. S. CONST. amend VI. 
169. "[Tlhe question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but 
whether guilt has been found by a jury." Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 
607,614 (1946). See generally Baltimore & Carolina Line Inc. v. Redman, 295 
U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (holding that while it is the court's province to decide the 
law and to instruct the jury as to the principles of law that govern its delibera- 
tions, it is the jury, and the jury alone, that determines the facts); State v. In- 
genito, 432 A.2d 912, 916 (N.J. 1981) (stating that although it is important that 
the evidence before the jury be as full and complete as possible in order to aid 
the jury in the discharge of its fundamental responsibilities, "[ilt is not ... the 
evidence of record that establishes a defendant's guilt or innocence but the 
jury's determination of the facts drawn from such evidence."). 
170. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1243. 
17 1.  United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 895 (3d Cir. 1994). 
172. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,443 (1970). 
173. See State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912,916 (N.J. 1981). 
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charge. '74 The jury is unable to fully perform "its paramount de- 
liberative and decisional resp~nsibilities"'~~ and therefore the de- 
fendant's right to a jury trial is fundamentally abridged. 
Another constitutional argument is that a textual and proce- 
dural analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, com- 
pared to the Seventh Amendment civil right to a jury trial, supports 
the conclusion that offensive issue preclusion cannot be applied in 
a criminal proceeding. The Seventh Amendment states, "In Suits 
in common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . 
.'y176 In contrast, the Sixth Amendment provides an absolute right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial Courts have 
held that issue preclusion can be applied in the civil context be- 
cause the right to a jury trial is preserved rather than guaranteed.17' 
Therefore, the difference in the language of the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments provides a textual anchor for the proposition that 
issue preclusion may not be applied against a criminal defendant.'79 
The courts that have allowed offensive issue preclusion have 
found that the defendant's right to a jury trial is not compromised 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
177. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal Prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ."). 
178. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. There are also procedural differences 
between criminal and civil trials that could be used to support the conclusion 
that preclusion is only appropriate in civil cases. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, the Court references these procedural devises to support its holding that 
collateral estoppel does not infringe on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 335-37 (1919). See Gallo- 
way v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-94 (1943) (stating that a directed ver- 
dict does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Gasoline Products Co. v. Cham- 
plin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-99 (1931) (holding retrial limited to question 
of damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Fidelity & Deposit Co. 
of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 321 (1902) (holding that summary 
judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment). 
179. United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 894 (3d Cir. 1994). When 
both the Sixth and Seventh Amendments were being ratified in 1791, collateral 
estoppel was being applied against a defendant in civil cases, but there are no 
cases where the government was allowed to invoke collateral estoppel. Id. at 
894-95. Therefore, "the framers intended them to have [a] different import by 
using dramatically different language[s]." Id. at 895. 
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in any way.lsO The elements of issue preclusion require that the 
issue be fully litigated and necessarily decided in the first proceed- 
ing.lgl The defendant is therefore afforded all of the procedural 
benefits of a.crimina1 proceeding including the incentive to fully 
litigate the issue in the first tria1.Ig2 There is no additional fact 
finding function for the jury to perform because the facts of the 
common issue were resolved in the first action.lg3 
It is true that a jury is less informed when an accused is unable 
to relitigate a certain issue in a second trial, but this does not seem 
to compromise the defendant's right to a jury trial under the Sixth 
Amendment.184 There are other situations where, as in issue pre- 
clusion, a court can take a subsequent action against a defendant 
without giving the defendant the benefit of a jury deliberation.Ig5 
The defendant was able to exercise his constitutional rights in the 
first tria1.1g6 There is no fact finding function in the second trial, 
because, as the Supreme Court has stated, "the whole premise of 
issue preclusion is that once an issue has been resolved in a prior 
proceeding, there is no further fact finding function to be per- 
formed. ,3187 In addition, a jury can still choose to acquit in the 
180. See, e.g., Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 
1975). 
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 27 (1982); United States 
v. Crooks, 804 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that in the criminal con- 
text, the collateral estoppel analysis involves a three-step analysis: (1) whether 
"the issues in the two actions are [identical in order to] determine whether they 
are sufficiently similar and material to justify invoking the [collateral estoppel] 
doctrine;" (2) whether, after an examination of the first record, it can be deter- 
mined that the issue was fully litigated; and (3) whether, after an examination of 
the first record, it can be ascertained that the issue was necessarily decided). 
182. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
183. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 336 n.23. 
184. Kennelly, supra note 6 at 1405-06. 
185. Id. at 1407. Professor Kennelly uses the harmless error review, the 
revocation of probation, and the appellate entry of conviction on lesser-included 
offenses as three examples of situations where a prior conviction justifies the 
court acting against the defendant without the defendant having an additional 
jury trial. Id. 
186. Kennelly, supra note 6, at 1405. 
187. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 336 n.23. 
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second action.Ig8 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial is not sufficient to make offensive issue preclusion unavail- 
able to the government. 
A third constitutional argument is that the application of of- 
fensive issue preclusion by the government violates the defen- 
dant's Fifth Amendment right to due process.lg9 Under the Due 
Process Clause, a criminal defendant has the right to a deterrnina- 
tion by a jury of whether the prosecution has proved every element 
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.lgO By finding that 
an element of the crime has been conclusively proven, the argu- 
ment is that the prosecution is relieved of its burden of proof.19' 
Not only is the prosecution relieved of its burden of proof, but the 
burden shifts to the defendant to overcome the prejudice of the jury 
created by the knowledge of the previous determination.19' 
In addition, the application of offensive issue preclusion jeop- 
ardizes the defendant's presumption of innocence, which is guar- 
anteed under the Due Process ~ 1 a u s e . l ~ ~  A criminal defendant's 
right to a presumption of evidence "is the undoubted law, axio- 
matic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of 
7,194 the administration of our criminal law. An instruction to a jury 
that one element is conclusively determined may constitute a 
strong "pull towards a guilty verdict. ,3195 Thus, issue preclusion 
violates the Due Process Clause because it threatens the presump- 
tion of innocence guaranteed to every criminal defendant. 
It seems, however, that if issue preclusion does not violate the 
right to a jury trial or the right to confront witnesses, then it should 
188. Kennelly, supra note 6 at 1405. 
189. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998). 
190. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Supreme Court stated, 
"we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 354. 
191. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Gallardo-Mendez, 150 
F.3d at 1240; United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107 (6th Cir. 1995). 
192. See State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912, 916-19 (N.J. 1981). 
193. Id. at 912; see Byrd v. People, 58 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2002); People v. 
Goss, 521 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. 1994). 
194. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,453 (1895). 
195. Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 918-19. 
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satisfy due process.lg6 Although under the doctrine of issue preclu- 
sion, a jury could hear about a defendant's prior conviction, this 
would only happen if the crime relates to a central issue in the sec- 
ond trial, not if it only relates to motive.lg7 If the court finds that 
applying issue preclusion would be fundamentally unfair and vio- 
late a defendant's due process rights, the court could refuse to ap- 
ply it in that particular case. 
B. Policy Arguments 
In addition to constitutional arguments, courts have refused to 
use offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases because the policy 
reasons used to support preclusion in civil cases do not justify the 
use of the doctrine against criminal defendants.Ig8 The notion of 
judicial efficiency and finality has been invoked in civil trials to 
support the use of issue preclusion since the prompt resolution of 
claims and finality are desirable goals in civil litigation.Ig9 The 
issue becomes whether these considerations have the same worth 
in criminal cases as they do in civil  case^.^" Courts have deter- 
mined that the efficiencies of issue preclusion pale in comparison 
to the importance of upholding a criminal defendant's right to vig- 
orously defend himself and protect his libert~.~" In Parklane, the 
196. See Kennelly, supra note 6 (pointing out how the state courts that 
have expressed concern about due process really seem to be talking about the 
right to trial and to confront witnesses). 
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 27 (1 982). One of the 
elements of issue preclusion is that the issue be identical in the first and second 
action. Id. 
198. See United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 634 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(declining to allow offensive issue preclusion against the accused, the Eleventh 
Circuit decided that ruling on the collateral estoppel motion would consume at 
least as much time as relitigating the issue, thereby "completely defeating the 
doctrine's goal [of] judicial efficiency and economy."). 
199. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 332, 326, 329-30 (1979); 
Blonder-Tongue Labs. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971). 
200. United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Hyslop v. United States, 261 
F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1958). 
201. See Lucido v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 795 P.2d 1223, 
1232 (Cal. 1990). A criminal defendant has interest of immense importance at 
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Court advocated the use of offensive issue preclusion in civil 
cases, but cautioned that the "offensive use of collateral estoppel 
does not promote judicial economy in the same manner as defen- 
'7202 sive collateral estoppel since "it may be unfair to defen- 
d a n t ~ . ' ' ~ ~ ~  In addition, judicial efficiency may be vitiated by the 
necessarily detailed review of the previous criminal proceeding to 
ensure that the defendant's rights have been protected. 
Yet, the use of offensive issue preclusion by the government 
has resulted in judicial efficiency.204 Illegal immigration puts an 
added burden on federal courts by requiring the determination of 
an alien's status prior to deportation. The federal docket backlog 
continues to grow and may deleteriously affect the quality of the 
federal courts.205 
The most serious problem is that issue preclusion has only 
been applied to defendants in cases involving alienage status is- 
stake, "both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon convic- 
tion and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the convic- 
tion." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1969). In his dissent in Ashe, Justice 
Burger stated that "in criminal cases, finality and conservation of private, 'public, 
and judicial resources are lesser values than in civil litigation . . . . [Clourts that 
have applied the collateral-estoppel concept to criminal actions would certainly 
not apply it to both parties, as is true in civil cases . . . ." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 
U.S. 436,464-65 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
202. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 329. 
203. Id. at 330. 
204. See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21-22 (8th Cir. 
1975) (holding that the relitigation of alienage issues undermines the purpose of 
federal immigration laws); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 787- 
88 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that without the threat of collateral estoppel, defen- 
dants would have the added incentive to attempt to illegally reenter the United 
States) But see Jonathan C. Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of 
Criminal Determinations: Theoretical, Practical, and Strategic Implications for 
Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1083 (1982) (finding that 
offensive issue preclusion does not promote judicial economy). 
205. See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking 
Plaint~ff Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. 
P m .  L. REV. 809, 81 1 (1989) (noting that duplicative litigation and resulting 
docket delays cause major problems in federal courts); Leonidas Ralph 
Mecham, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial 
Caseload: A Five-Year Retrospective (1998), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
caseload.pdf (finding that federal courts' caseload has reached record heights). 
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sues, which rings suspiciously of xenophobia.206 Since the terrorist 
attacks of September 1 1, 2001, there has been serious scrutiny of 
the immigration laws. There were calls to halt immigration alto- 
gether,207 draft harsher immigration laws,208 close the borders with 
Canada and ~ e x i c o , ~ ~ ~  and stop the issuance of foreign student 
 isa as.^" Although none of these things happened, there continues 
to be a heightened awareness of issues with immigration. One way 
to address security concerns is through interior enforcement. More 
than ever, federal immigration authorities are using federal crimi- 
nal laws to target illegal  alien^.^" Immigration officials are being 
206. Daly, supra note 6, at 694-95. 
207. See Eric Lichtblau, Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Nick Anderson, After 
The Attack; Security Clampdown; Government Seeks Expanded Powers to Plug 
Security Holes; Safety: Oficials want tougher immigration restrictions and 
greater use of wiretaps on terrorism suspects, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17,2001, at A9 
(noting that "[slome immigration experts speculate that the Bush administration 
could consider invoking Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
giving the president the authority to restrict the exit and entry of any foreign 
nationals."); see also Myriam Marquez, Editorial, To Ideologues: Stop Painting 
The War In Your Own Image, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 27,2001, at A15. 
208. See Greg Miller & Nick Anderson, After the Attack; National Secu- 
rity; Mood Swlfrly Changes on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at A12 
(reporting that "[tlhe White House made it clear Monday [September 17, 20011 
that tightening restrictions will be on its agenda, too, as Atty. Gen. John 
Ashcroft said new immigration measures will be part of an anti-terrorism legis- 
lative package delivered to Congress this week."). 
209. See Courtney Lingle, Mexican Immigrants Fear Border Closing, Lo- 
cal Community Pleads: Don't Punish Us For Attacks, DENVER POST, Sept. 26, 
2001 at A1 1; see also Editorial, Step up, clamp down; If the United States is to 
become safer and more secure from terrorism, Canada needs to be more strict 
with its border and immigration regulations, ATLANTA J O U R N A L - C O N S T ~ O N ,  
Sept. 26,2001, at A12. 
210. See Ved P .  Nanda, Tightened Visa Restrictions Have Flaws, DENVER 
POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at B7 (stating that "[s]hortly after Sept. 11, Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein, D-Calif., proposed a six-month moratorium on student visas. After 
discussions with several prominent university officials, however, she instead 
proposed more careful tracking."); see also Jonathan Peterson & Rebecca 
Trounson, Response To Terror; Foreign Students Scrutinized, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2001, at Al ;  see also Carolyn Lochhead, Feinstein tries to put student visas 
on hold; Hijack suspect abused system, she says, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 28, 
2001, at Al. 
21 1. For example, in April 2003, John Ashcroft ordered all Haitians seek- 
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unusually aggressive in deporting aliens to countries such as Ja- 
maica, Guyana, and ~ o n d u r a s . ~ ~ ~  The use of collateral estoppel, 
especially in cases involving citizenship status, has the potential to 
be abused in this time of heightened scrutiny. This is bolstered by 
the fact that even before this increase in emphasis on interior en- 
forcement, the only time that courts have successfully used offen- 
sive issue preclusion was in immigration Therefore, it is 
important that any test be extremely sensitive to potential abuse as 
a result of xenophobia. 
VI. A NEW TEST: RULES PLUS FAIRNESS 
Upon balance, offensive issue preclusion, if applied carefully 
and consistently, is a useful tool. The main problem, however, is 
that the courts only seem to embrace it in cases that deal with the 
alienage status issue. Therefore, it is important to address this 
concern in formulating a test for the courts to follow. On the other 
hand, a danger arises in formulating a test that becomes so com- 
plex that the "goal of greater fairness is also thwarted. ,9214 u ~ h ~  
critical task," therefore, is to "define rules that provide answers 
that are both clear and just for most cases, and that incorporate lev- 
els of flexibility and discretion that permit just results in special 
cases without undermining the general rules. 7,215 
In Parklane, the Supreme Court created a broad discretionary 
test for allowing offensive preclusion in civil cases in the federal 
Although the Court did not explicitly set out factors that 
subsequent courts should examine, the Court did state its concerns 
ing asylum to be indefinitely detained on the ground that immigration from Haiti 
is a threat to national security. Immigration authorities were even deporting 
immigrants to Somalia, where there is no functioning government and where al- 
Queda has allegedly established a base of operations. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 
F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting an injunction forbidding those deportations). 
2 12. See www.usdoj .gov/oig/speciaY03-061. 
213. See supra notes 115, 123, 129, 135, 151, and 154. 
214. 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE $4403, at 45 (2d ed. 2002). 
215. Id. § 4416, at 400. 
216. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322,331 (1979). 
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about the use of offensive preclusion.'" For example, if the darn- 
ages in the first lawsuit were small, the defendant might not have 
litigated the first suit aggre~sivel~."~ If there were different proce- 
dural options available in the first and second actions, the defen- 
dant might not have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the 
first a~ t ion ."~  The Court also had concerns about plaintiffs adopt- 
ing a "wait and see" attitude, hoping that another plaintiff will 
bring a suit against the defendant that results in a favorable judg- 
ment.'" Instead of aiding judicial economy, this attitude thwarts it 
by keeping plaintiffs from consolidating initial  lawsuit^.'^' Yet, 
the Court held that "the preferable approach for dealing with these 
problems . . . [is] to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine 
when it should be applied. ,7222 
This test is too broad to be useful in applying non-mutual of- 
fensive issue preclusion in the criminal context. Further, the con- 
cerns that are raised on the civil side are different from the con- 
cerns raised on the criminal side. For example, there is little con- 
cern that prosecutors will adopt a "wait and see" attitude and bring 
separate prosecutions to perfect their case.223 On the other hand, 
the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants raise 
grave concerns about individual freedom and rights. 
In United States v. ~ e v a s s e u r , ~ ~ ~  the Massachusetts District 
Court created a test in a complicated criminal RICO case involving 
numerous pre-trial motions.22s The defendants had been "previ- 
217. Id. at 329-31. 
218. Id. at 330-31. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 330. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 33 1 .  
223. Prosecutors have little to gain by bringing separate prosecutions to 
perfect their cases. In United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), the Court 
pointed out that under Ashe, an acquittal in the first action will probably bar 
litigation of essential facts in a new prosecution of the same defendant. Id. at 
710-11 n.15 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)). In addition, prose- 
cutors should "be deterred from abusive, repeated prosecutions" because of  
limited judicial resources and other demands on their time. Id. 
224. 699 F. Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1988). 
225. United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1988), rev'd 
on other grounds, 846 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1988). The defendants were indicted 
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ously tried in the Eastern District of New York on an indictment 
charging them with conspiracy to bomb buildings," an actual 
bombing, and an attempted bombing.226 Following a trial, the de- 
fendants were convicted on some of the counts and a mistrial was 
declared for the other counts wherein the jury was unable to reach 
a The government then decided to pursue these "open 
counts" in a Massachusetts federal All of the open counts 
from the trial in the Eastern District of New York were among the 
predicate acts set out in the Massachusetts indictment to sustain the 
alleged RICO violation.229 The defendants moved to suppress, 
seeking to preclude the government from introducing evidence of 
the predicate acts that had already been tried in the Eastern District 
of New York and had resulted in a mistrial.230 In response, the 
government asserted that, because the substance of the defendants' 
motion to dismiss had already been litigated and denied in a case 
involving the same defendants in the Eastern District of New York, 
the defendants should be collaterally estopped from suppressing 
the evidence.231 
In order to render its decision, the Massachusetts court created 
a test outlining criteria that must be met to allow the government to 
use offensive issue preclusion.232 First, there must be an exact 
identity of the issues in both proceedings.233 Second, "a defendant 
must have had sufficient incentive to have vigorously . . . litigated 
the issue in [the] previous proceeding. "234 Third, "the defendant 
estopped must have been a party to the previous litigation. 9,235 
Fourth, the applicable law has to be identical in both proceed- 
for three counts of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 1962(c). Id. at 968. 
226. Id. at 969. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 969-70. 
229. Id. at 970. 
230. Id. at 979. 
23 1 .  Id. at 980. 
232. Id. at 981. 
233. Id. This is an element of preclusion under any test. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
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i n g ~ . ~ ~ ~  Finally, "the first proceeding must result in a final judg- 
ment on the merits that provides the defendant" with the opportu- 
nity and incentive to The court also noted that even if 
this criteria is satisfied, offensive issue preclusion "may still be 
improper under certain circumstances," such as a change in the 
governing law, or a showing that the defendant had ineffective as- 
sistance of counsel at the first proceeding.238 
The Levasseur test, which is much more specific than the test 
in Parklane, provides a framework that could be applied to all 
criminal cases involving offensive preclusion.239 The requirement 
that the issues be identical in both lawsuits, the requirement that 
the defendant have had sufficient incentive to vigorously litigate 
the issue in the first litigation, and the requirement that the first 
litigation end in a final judgment all must be satisfied to meet the 
general elements of p r e c l u ~ i o n . ~ ~  These protect the defendant 
from violations of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amend- 
ment because the facts of the common issue were resolved in the 
first action.24' Under this framework, a guilty plea by itself could 
not be a basis for preclusion because the issues would not have 
been fully litigated.242 
236. Id. In explaining this element, the court stated that "if the proceed- 
ings . . . take place in districts in different circuits, the defendant cannot be es- 
topped unless the governing law is the same." Id. There was no additional 
precedent provided for this element. When the court applied this element to the 
facts of the case before it, the court found that the case law was identical be- 
cause the law applying to the collateral estoppel issue was mostly Supreme 
Court precedent. Levasseur, 669 F. Supp. at 981. It is not clear whether the 
court was refemng to the law of collateral estoppel or the substantive law sur- 
rounding the issue. 
237. Levasseur, 669 F. Supp. at 98 1. 
238. Id. at 981 n.23. In United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633 (1 lth Cir. 
1992), the Eleventh Circuit criticized the Levasseur analysis by stating "that it 
would create more problems than it was designed to solve." Id. at 635. It would 
therefore completely defeat the doctrine's goals-judicial efficiency and econ- 
omy. Id. See also Kennell, supra note 6 (reviewing the Levasseur criteria and 
finding that it is over inclusive in some ways and under inclusive in others). 
239. See id. 
240. See id. 
241. Id.at981. 
242. In United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998), 
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This test has one additional requirement: that the court per- 
form an additional "fairness" examination even if the criteria are 
satisfied.243 This "fairness" examination should be used by the 
court to ensure that the doctrine is not only being applied in cases 
involving illegal aliens. In this way, policy concerns about illegal 
aliens will not usurp a defendant's right to a fair and just 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While continuing to address the threats of terrorism, courts 
must decide how the United States should protect the civil liberties 
of its citizens and non-citizens while securing them from the threat 
of a terrorist attack. Part of this scrutiny involves the decision of 
whether to allow offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases in 
light of the potential to target its use in cases involving alien citi- 
zenship status. Currently, in the federal civil context, defensive 
issue preclusion is almost always allowed, while offensive issue 
preclusion is allowed on a case-by-case basis.245 In the federal 
criminal context, a criminal defendant can always use defensive 
issue preclusion against the government in the second action when 
the defendant was acquitted in the first action.246 The question be- 
comes whether the government can use issue preclusion offen- 
sively to bar the criminal defendant from relitigating an issue that 
was decided against the defendant in the first action. 
the court found that a plea of guilty to illegal entry could not be used for collat- 
eral estoppel in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Id. at 1244. But see United 
States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980) (opining that a volun- 
tary guilty plea constitutes an admission of all the facts alleged in the indictment 
and therefore it is fair to estop the defendant from litigating one of those facts at 
a subsequent criminal proceeding); Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 
20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding that defendant, by a voluntary plea, waived con- 
stitutional rights in a subsequent proceeding). 
243. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. at 981. 
244. For a general discussion of some of the policy concerns involving 
issues of status, see Daly, supra note 6; Tanya Kateri Hernandez, The Construc- 
tion of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure of Immigration Controls and 
Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731 (1997) (noting current anti-immigrant sentiment). 
245. See supra note 56-57 and accompanying text. 
246. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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The test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Park- 
lane, which addressed the factors a court should look at in deciding 
whether there should be offensive issue preclusion in civil cases, is 
not sufficient to address the myriad of concerns that are present in 
the criminal context. On balance, however, offensive issue preclu- 
sion in criminal cases is a useful tool that does not necessarily in- 
fringe on defendants' constitutional rights and can serve important 
policy objectives of judicial economy and finality. Therefore, it is 
important to create a new, more specific test that allows the gov- 
ernment to use offensive preclusion against criminal defendants in 
appropriate cases. 
Immigration has influenced the face of the United States more 
than any other cultural, political, or economic policy. If used 
carefully and consistently by the courts, offensive issue preclusion 
can prevent unnecessary litigation, discourage subsequent crimes, 
and even prevent an influx of illegal aliens. As a country that is 
committed to its heritage as a nation of immigrants and as a refuge 
for those escaping oppression and seeking opportunity, we can be 
equally committed to the fair and constitutional use of collateral 
estoppel. 
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